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tion of voice and writing name for comparison of signature were never in-
tended to be included in the privilege. No coercion, nor hope, nor fear can
change the physical facts obtained by such comparison.
P. C. R.
NnGrLiGENCF-PHYsIcrAN AND Su Eox-ExPE&T TFSTIMONY-Appellant,
a surgeon, performed a surgical operation on appellee to remove a tumor
"or growth of some kind" from appellee's abdominal cavity. An absorbent
sponge used to "wall off" the intestines was left in the incision which caused
irritation and made a second operation necessary for its removal. Appellee
sued for damages caused by the alleged negligence of the appellant in let-
ting the sponge remain. Nurses were relied on by the appellant to check the
number of sponges to be used that all were removed. By testimony of
physicians and surgeons, appellant proved on the trial that the recognized
and accepted methods of surgery had been followed. There was no testi-
mony of a physician or surgeon to the contrary. A jury found for the
appellee and the trial court entered judgment in her favor upon the ver-
dict. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court, holding that the ques-
tion of whether or not a physician or surgeon has in a given case exer-
cised reasonable care is a question of science for experts. The Supreme
Court transferred the cause under Section 1357, Cl. 2, Burns 1926, Acts
1901, p. 565, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.1
It was contended by appellant that testimony of experts was necessary
to prove the alleged negligence of the appellant and the Appellate Court
so held. Most of the malpractice cases involve a failure in duty or lack
of skill. This is ordinarily a question of scientific knowledge about which
the layman is not competent to testify and when an issue does involve
scientific knowledge, expert testimony is necessary.2 Authorities are nu-
merous to sustain this proposition. But this rule applies only where a
scientific question is involved. There are apparent exceptions to this gen-
eral rule as where the defendant is so clearly at fault that no scientific
knowledge is necessary to place that fault, and therefore no expert testi-
mony is required.S The instant case is such a case. Speaking of the simi-
lar case of Ault v. HaZl, supra, where nurses were relied'on to count the
sponges, Professor Francis H. Bohlen said: "The Supreme Court of Ohio,
none the less held that the jury might find that the surgeon was liable. At
first glance this seems contrary to the general view of American courts
in regard to the liability of physicians. However, the general rule applies
only to determine the professional skill, the extent of knowledge of the
act which a patient in a particular locality is entitled to expect. Of such
matters the ordinary lay witness is no judge, or at least the medical pro-
' Funk v. Bonham, bSupreme Court of Indiana, July 29, 1932, 183 N. BJ. 312.2Bwing v. Goode (1897), 78 Fed. 442; Adolay v. Miller (1916), 60 Ind. App.
656, 111 N. R.313; Longfellow v. Vernon (1914), 57 Ind. App. 611, 105 N. E. 178;
Jackson v. Burnham (1895), 20 Colo. 532, 39 Fa. 577; Sawyer v. Berthold (1912),
116 Minn. 441, 134 N. W. 120; McCoy v. Buck (1927), 87 Ind. App. 433, 157 N. E.
456.
aEvans v. Roberts (1915), 172 Iowa 653, 154 N. W. 923; Wharton v. Warner
(1913), 75 Wash. 470, 135 Paa. 235, 237; Reynolds v. Smith (1910), 148 Iowa 271,
127 X. W. 192; Walker Hospital v. Pulley (1920), 74 Ind. App. 659, 664, 127 N. E.
559; Ault v. Hall (1928), 119 Ohio St 422, 164 N. .. 518.
RECENT CASE NOTES
fession has staunchly maintained and succeeded in legally establishing
its contention, that only the medical and surgical profession can determine
what is good medical and surgical practice. In so far as the matter lies in
the realm of purely professional competence, this view seems to be uni-
versally held. The question presented in A2dt v. Hall requires no medical
knowledge to solve. It is not a question of diagnosis or of the manner
in which a particular operation is to be performed. The ordinary layman
is quite as competent as the most experienced surgeon to realize the danger
of so purely a routine practice as that of counting sponges after an opera-
tion so as to make sure that all that were provided are accounted for.
In a word, this case shows that even where the conduct of a physician is
concerned the standard of the profession is to apply only in matters of
medical art, and do not include those matters which lie within the knowl-
edge and judgment of laymen."4 In such a case the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies. 5 The surgeon has complete control of the situation, there
is no necessity for dealing with matters of scientific knowledge, and the
injury is one which would not ordinarily occur.
One recent case has gone even further. In McCormick v. Jones, the
jury found for the defendant. This meant they found either no negligence
or no damage. The Supreme Court of Washington there ruled that there
was negligence as a matter of law saying: "We also think that the court
can say as a matter of law that when a surgeon inadvertently introduces
into a wound a foreign substance, closes the wound, leaving that foreign
substance in the body, there being no possibility of any good purpose re-
sulting therefrom, that act constitutes negligence."6
Here the appellant did not claim that any good result could come from
letting the sponge remain in the incision. Had he so contended, scientific
knowledge would be necessary and expert testimony would have been re-
quired under the general rule. He claimed that he used ordinary care to
guard against leaving the sponge in appellee's abdomen. But following
even a reasonable custom does not necessarily establish freedom from
negligence in a particular case. It is merely a circumstance to be weighed
by the jury.7
The appellant further insists that if any negligence was shown, it was
negligence upon the part of the nurses who assisted in the operation and
who were employed by the hospital, and not negligence on his part. Here
the appellant was employed to perform a surgical operation upon the per-
son of the appellee. Performance of the operation has been held to include
all acts from the opening of the incision to the closing of that incision.
The Georgia Supreme Court has said: "It seems to us that the operation
begins when the opening is made into the body and ends when this open-
ing has been closed in a proper way, after all appliances necessary to the
'4 Tulane L. Rev. 370.
5 Sellers v. Noah (1923), 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167; Davis v. Kerr (1913), 239
Pa. 551, 86 At. 1007; Reynolds v. Smith (1910), 148 Iowa 271, 127 N. W. 192;
Evans v. Munro (1912), 83 At. 82; Benson v. Dean (1921), 232 N. Y. 52, 133
N. E. 125.
6McCormicl v. Jones (1929), 152 Wash. 508, 278 Pac. 181.
'Davis v. Herr (1913), 239 Pa. 551, 86 At. 1007; Evans v. Munro (1912), 83
Atl. 82; Sellers v. Noah (1923), 209 Ala. 103, 95 So. 167; Ault v. Hall (1928), 119
Ohio St. 422, 164 N. E. 518.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
successful operation have been removed from the body."8 It would per-
haps be reasonable in some instances to provide for another surgeon to
close the incision, but in the absence of such a provision the only reason-
able understanding as to the undertaking of the surgeon is that perform-
ing the operation includes closing the incision and the duty to remove all
foreign substances from the wound is an integral part of the operation.9
This duty can now be avoided and a hospital rule requiring attending
nurses to tally the sponges used and removed will not relieve the surgeon
of liability for a sponge negligently left in the wound.1O The fact that
the nurses used in the operation are the nurses of the hospital and that
the hospital is not owned or controlled by the surgeon do not relieve the
surgeon. As to the master and servant relationship when the servant is
used by another, the Appellate Court of Indiana has said: "The true test
in such cases is to ascertain who directed the movement of the person
committing the injury. When one person lends a servant to another for a
particular employment, the servant for anything done in that particular
employment must be dealt with as the servant of the man to whom he is
lent, although he remains the general servant of the person who lent
him."1 1 Under this test the nurses in the instant case were the servants
of the operating surgeon.12
It appears that the courts have taken three distinct views as to the
so-called "sponge cases." First, that such cases are no different from the
ordinary malpractice case and expert testimony alone is admissible in evi-
dence to prove the surgeon's negligence.13 Sedond, that a case of a sponge
being left in the incision is an apparent exception to the ordinary mal-
practice case and no expert testimony is required to warrant the jury in
finding the surgeon negligent.14 And third, that where a surgeon leaves a
sponge in a patient's body, "there being no possibility of any good purpose
resulting therefrom," that act constitutes negligence as a matter of law.15
For this class of border line case the Indiana Supreme Court has adopted
the second and middle view.
J. S. H.
PLEADINGs-CoNsTRUCTION-PLAINTIFF MUST ALEE COMPLIANCE WITH
STATUTe--This was an action of tort for fraud of an alleged agent in re-
spect to duty arising out of contract. Plaintiff alleged that he was engaged
in real estate business in Mississippi and a non-resident of Indiana; that
sAkridge v. Noble (1902), 114 Ga. 949, 41 S. E. 78.
9 Palmer v. Humiston (1913), 87 Ohio St. 401, 101 N. E. 283; Harris v. Fan
(1910), 177 Fed. 79; Akridge v. Noble (1902), 114 Ga. 949, 41 S. E. 78; McCor-
micc v. Jones (1929), 152 Wash. 508, 278 Pac. 181; Gillette v. Tucker (1902), 67
Ohio St. 106, 65 N. E. 865.
0Spears v. McKinnon (1924), 168 Ark. 357, 270 9. W. 524; Barnett's Aclm'r v.
Brand (1915), 165 Ky. 616, 177 S. W. 461; Davis v. Herr (1913), 239 Pa. 551,
86 At. 1007; Palmer va. Humistoa (1913), 87 Ohio St. 401, 101 N. E. 283. See
21 R. C. L. 388.
"Sargent Paint Co. va. Petrovitz (1919), 71 Ind. App. 367, 124 N. D. 883; 885.
1 Discussed in 3 Ind. L. T. 474.
"3Blackburn va. Baker (1929), 237 N. Y. S. 611; Guen v. Tenny (1928), 262
Mass. 54, 159 N. R. 451.
4"Ault v. Hall (1928), 119 Ohio (St. 422, 164 N. 39. 18; 'Walker Hospital V.
Pulley (1920), 74 Ind. App. 659, 664, 127 N. Ml. 559.
"McCormick va. Jones (1929), 152 Wash. 508, 278 Pac. 181.
